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A Republic in its Own Time: 
The Re-Imagining of Republican Theory in the Federalist Papers 
 
In Federalist no. 48, James Madison remarked upon his own task of constitution building: 
“The founders of our republics have so much merit for the wisdom which they have displayed, 
that no task can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into which they have fallen.”1 
This quote captured how Madison saw himself in the historic moment of creating an American 
federal constitution. It first demonstrates Madison’s clear admiration for the republics the states 
have created individually. More broadly, this was a recognition of the merit and wisdom which 
can be found in republican constitutions. Not only that, but Madison saw himself as a 
continuation of this intellectual tradition of republican thinkers, as he was tasked with learning 
from their mistakes and fixing them in the republic he and the other framers constructed. It was 
within this framework, of admiration for past ideas with the need to update them to their own 
circumstances, that the American framers found themselves. Though this task may not have been 
pleasing, it was a task that Madison and others nonetheless pursued as they saw the necessity of 
their historical moment.  
The constitution imagined by the American federalist framers was a republic in its 
design. Their ideas about government were directly informed by their study of republics and 
republican theory throughout history, and this knowledge was taken and applied to their own 
 
1 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, “The Federalist Papers” Congress.gov Resources. December 12, 
2011. https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers Federalist 48.  




task of constitution creation. These thinkers were educated in the republican tradition, their 
discourse was set in republican terms, the problems of government they feared were bred from 
the republican tradition, and the constitution held republican principles as its foundation. The 
classical republican tradition cannot be separated from the political ideology of the American 
framers. In imagining their new government, the American framers did divert from republican 
precedent in their conceptions of virtue and the individual, but only in an attempt to create what 
they saw as a more perfect form of republicanism. The Constitution of the United States certainly 
falls in line with the republican tradition as it is a result of the framers utilizing republican values 
and theory in order to apply them to the United States.  
The discussion among historians surrounding the political philosophy of the framers has 
centered on the liberalism/republicanism dichotomy. At one end of the spectrum are those, such 
as Maurizio Viroli and Paul Rahe, who argue that the framers were products of liberalism and 
that they created a new, liberal system.2 At the other end of the spectrum are authors, such as 
J.G.A. Pocock and Carl J. Richard, who argue the framers are in line with republican thought and 
are descendants of the republican tradition of thought.3 Others still, such as Isaac Kramnick, 
Gordon Wood, and Andrew Shankman, argue the framers fall somewhere between these 
traditions.4 They argue that what the framers created can be described as a sort of synthesis of 
 
2 See: Maurizio Viroli, Republicanism, Translated by Antony Shugaar, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1999); Paul 
Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern The Ancien Regime in Classical Greece, (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1994) 
3 See: Carl J. Richard, The Founders and the Classics Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightenment, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1995); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republican Tradition, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016) 
4 See: Isaac Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion": The Discourse of Politics in 1787, In The William and 
Mary Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan., 1988), pp. 3-32., PDF, Accessed: 
file:///C:/Users/jonah/Downloads/Kramnick%20Discourse%20of%20Politics.pdf; Andrew Shankman, Original 
Intents Hamilton, Madison, and the American Founding, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Gordon S. 




both traditions or at the very least that the framers drew on each so interchangeably that their 
specific blend represents a confusion of terms that creates a complicated blend of each. Finally, 
Joseph Postell argues that the liberalism/republicanism dichotomy does not exist in such a sharp 
distinction in the minds of the framers as they do for contemporary thinkers.5 Regardless, this 
balance between liberalism and republicanism has dominated the discourse surrounding the 
American founding in the desire to understand the framers’ political ideology.  
The argument of this essay, in reference to the existing debate of the intellectual 
traditions informing the framers, will focus on how they were members of the republican 
tradition. Though there are aspects of the framers’ thought which can certainly fit under the 
broader umbrella of “liberalism”, labeling the framers as liberal thinkers exclusively is a 
misrepresentation of their ideology. To begin with, there existed no comprehensive ideology of 
liberalism as it is understood today.  Liberalism in contemporary discourse is a system based on 
natural rights which predate government, and are therefore immune from encroachment, which 
are centered on private property and personal liberty. Some of these ideas, such as natural rights, 
are present in the writings of the Federalist Papers. However, to assert their inclusion is 
indicative of a broader liberal basis of political ideology of the framers would misrepresent their 
thoughts. The framers were educated in republican theory and likewise republican thought 
formed the basis for their political discourse and understanding. They believed they were 
creating a republic and therefore their more liberal developments still can be viewed as 
consistent with their pursuit of creating a more durable form of republicanism. There was not 
such a strict distinction between uniquely republican and liberal ideas for the framers so it was 
 
5 See: Joseph Postell, “Regulation During the American Founding: Achieving Liberalism and Republicanism”, In 




not a matter of balancing the two in their mind, but their focus was on creating a republic which 
would be stable and resist the problems of past systems of government.6 Therefore, it is only fair 
to the framers to situate them as members of the intellectual tradition they saw themselves as part 
of and which dominated their political discourse: republicanism.  
The analysis of this essay will be a close reading of the Federalist Papers. By focusing 
this analysis through the Federalist Papers, the conclusions drawn are by consequence narrow. 
Written by John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison under the pseudonym “Publius”, 
these essays had the purpose of convincing Americans to adopt the new constitution. All three 
authors are federalists and fall on the same side of the ratification debate, but these essays are not 
a comprehensive political manifesto of federalist thought. Though these essays represent a 
consistent ideology amongst the three authors, the ideas presented are of these authors alone. 
Therefore, when the terms “framer” or “federalist” are referred to throughout this paper, they 
should be understood as referring to these three men, as they were federalists and involved in the 
actual framing of the Constitution. This is important because the analysis in this paper is through 
the lens of the Federalist Papers, and therefore any broader federalist or framer thought 
represented in this paper is through the filter of these three authors.  
These essays serve as an explanation of the authors’ understanding of republican thought 
and its relevance to the task of American constitution building. The authors spend a tremendous 
amount of time throughout their essays justifying their model of republicanism through the use 
of existing republican theory. These are also effective sources for analyzing the relationship of 
 
6 Joseph Postell, “Regulation During the American Founding: Achieving Liberalism and Republicanism”, In 





those on both sides of the ratification debate to republicanism. The authors of the Federalist 
Papers respond to antifederalist concerns and made positive assertions about the merits of their 
own ideas. Thus, these essays are a valuable lens by which the federalists’ relationship to, and 
ideas regarding, classical republican theory can be examined. The authors are building off the 
republican tradition and applying, and in some cases augmenting, republican precedent in order 
to lay out their vision of how the American republic should be structured. 
To understand the intellectual tradition the authors are drawing on to form their 
conception of republicanism, a discussion of republicanism’s intellectual history is necessary. 
Republican theory begins with the first republics in history, Greece and Rome, and continues as 
a basis of political ideology to the establishment of the United States. Authors such as Cicero, 
Livy, Polybius, and Plutarch are foundational in describing how these original ancient republics 
functioned. The ancient authors’ manuscripts served as true observations of the nature of 
republicanism for later intellectuals. Though ancient accounts are viewed with more skepticism 
by modern historians, those engaged in republican political discourse, and certainly the authors 
of the Federalist Papers, saw these ancient authors as foundational to their own understanding of 
republicanism.7 The next influential author in the history of republican thought was Niccolò 
Machiavelli. The 15th century Italian author approached political theory with scientific rigor as 
he sought to answer his central question of what made the Roman republic work.8 His 
Discourses on Livy, a work which analyzes Livy’s Histories, attempts to answer this question 
and outlines Machiavelli’s own ideas regarding republicanism from his study of the ancient 
models. Building on republican thought, Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws follows 
 
7 Richard, Founders and the Classics, 53. 
8 Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Translated by Julia Conway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 19. 
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Machiavelli’s precedent in trying to understand what it is that makes republicanism function. His 
work is concerned with understanding the essential spirit of republicanism in contrast with other 
forms of government.9 Montesquieu was clearly influential in the minds of the framers as he is 
quoted directly numerous times throughout the Federalist Papers, and his ideas are indirectly 
addressed when the framers are working outside of republican precedent. Finally, David Hume’s 
contribution to republican theory is worth noting because he was more contemporary to the 
American framers than the other thinkers discussed thus far. He wrote in the early to mid-18th 
century, and the framers were certainly familiar with his work and his ideas were incorporated in 
their work.10 Hume was concerned, as were the framers, with making republicanism work in an 
increasingly changing modern world, especially making republicanism compatible with 
commercial society.11 These authors are among the most influential in the republican intellectual 
tradition. They were certainly influential in the minds of the framers and their ideas form the 
basis of the American framers’ republican knowledge.  
From these authors of republican theory, a comprehensive understanding of 
republicanism can be described which would represent the basis of the knowledge the American 
framers possessed. To Madison, a republic was “a government which derives all its powers 
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding 
their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior”.12 This quote 
underscores a few important aspects of classical republicanism as it was understood by the 
 
9 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Translated and edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold 
Samuel Stone, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Xlii. 
10 Daniel W. Howe, “The Political Psychology of the Federalist” in The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 
3, The Constitution of the United States (Jul., 1987), pp. 485-509; PDF, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1939767.pdf, 490. 
11 David Hume, Selected Essays, Edited by Stephen Copley and Andrew Edgar, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), Xviii. 
12 Madison, Federalist 39. 
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framers. The first being that republican power rests in its citizenry and is therefore responsible 
for providing for the good of all. The “common good” of republican theory is a common good 
which is in the interest of the perseverance of the community as a whole. In other words, it is not 
always what may be in each individual’s interest, but it is a common good which seeks to 
provide for the health of the community as a political entity.13 This common good was also a 
recognition of the interdependence amongst citizens. Individuals saw that their well-being was 
tied to that of their fellow citizens, which caused them to collectively pursue a common good.  
The second crucial point Madison touched on with his definition is the idea of “good 
behavior”, which for the purposes of understanding republican thought can be used to highlight 
the role of “virtue” in republican systems. Virtue was the force that motivated citizens to act in 
accordance with the pursuit of common good. It was the love of one’s homeland which instilled 
in citizens a preference of the public interest over their own.14 For citizens in ancient republics, 
this was expressed in its fullest form through warfare. Displaying glory on the battlefield in 
protection of one’s homeland was the ultimate expression of virtue because citizens are risking 
their own life for the security and freedom of their homeland.15 Warfare was also the most 
palpable example of interdependence for Republican thinkers. Warfare made it nearly impossible 
to deny one’s interdependence with their countrymen, as individual soldiers’ lives relied just as 
much on the men fighting to either side of them as their own skill in war. The expression of 
interdependence in warfare its most clear example in republics, and along with virtue and pursuit 
of a common good formed the sine qua non of republican government. The framers derived their 
understanding of republicanism from their classical education, and it is from this foundational 
 
13 Maurizio Viroli, Republicanism, Translated by Antony Shugaar, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1999), 11. 
14 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 36. 
15 Viroli, Republicanism, 75. 
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knowledge of republican government’s essential principles that the framers created their own 
republic.  
This paper will consist of three sections. The first section will discuss the classical 
education of the framers which instilled in them their knowledge of and reverence for classical 
Greek and Roman authors. This section will also discuss the fundamental principles of 
republicanism, namely enlightened rule and pursuit of the common good, which the framers 
adopted directly from the classical tradition. Then, the paper will transition to a discussion of 
how the federalists sought to solve the problems of licentiousness and tyranny as they appear in 
republican thought. This section, along with the first, will situate the framers within the 
intellectual context of classical republican thought. Therefore, in the transition to the third 
section, which discusses the changes to republican thought the framers instituted, it will be clear 
how they are creating change that is compatible with the established republican tradition. The 
changes that will be discussed are the new conceptions of virtue and of the individual in relation 
to the republic instituted by the framers. By focusing on these three areas, this paper will make 
clear the American framers were the products of classical republican thought and that this 
intellectual tradition provided the basis for the creation of the American Constitution.  
 
I. Classical Roots of Republican Principles 
 
The framers of the American Constitution were clearly out to create a republic and their 
understanding of government was forged in the republican tradition. Their vast knowledge of the 
classical republican tradition solidified their vision of how a government should function and its 
goals. This classical understanding of governance is manifested in the federalists’ insistence on 
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creating a government ruled through the virtue of the best of a community in the interest of the 
common good. 
Education for the intellectuals involved in the formation of the United States consisted 
almost exclusively of the classics. Greek and Roman authors dominated the education system 
and instilled in students a certain reverence for their works. The classics constituted the largest 
share of a grammar school student’s material each day.16 What this did was instill the classics as 
the intellectual basis of the framers at a young age which clearly stuck with them beyond their 
youth. Hamilton and other framers maintained “commonplace books” after their education. 
These were books that would be filled with passages and quotes that they saw as interesting and 
that they would want to reference later. Madison’s commonplace book, for example, was filled 
with Latin quotations of ancient authors such as Aristotle, Sallust, Cicero, and Tacitus.17 It was 
true as well that the framers saw themselves in classical terms. They found kinship with their 
ancient counterparts in their struggle against tyranny and in their role as republic builders.18  
This connection to a classical tradition is also apparent in the writing of the Federalist 
Papers. Perhaps the most obvious allusion to antiquity was the authors’ adoption of the 
pseudonym “Publius”. Publius, as Plutarch said, was one of the original founders of the Roman 
Republic. The name Publius then, was a statement in itself, aligning the authors of the Federalist 
Papers with ancient republican framers. The Federalist Papers are riddled with allusions to 
antiquity when discussing the authors’ own ideas. Federalist no. 63 highlighted the errors of 
Socrates’ trial that are used as justification for later checks on the passions of the many.19 In 
 
16 Carl J. Richard, The Founders and the Classics Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightenment, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1995) 14. 
17 Richards, Founders and the Classics, 24-25. 
18 Richards, Founders and the Classics, 8.  
19 Madison, Federalist 63.  
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Federalist no. 18, Hamilton described the Grecian republics as the most considerable of ancient 
confederacies.20 Later republican thinkers are utilized as well in conjunction with the Federalist’s 
own use of classical examples. In Federalist no. 9 Hamilton lets Montesquieu’s own words 
justify his thoughts on the strength of confederate republics.21 What these examples make 
abundantly clear is Publius’ own conception as a part of this republican tradition and that their 
task was to create a republic. Hamilton captures this desire to institute a republic as central to the 
task of the framers, as he said in Federalist no. 1. A central object is the assurance of “conformity 
of the proposed constitution to the true principles of republican government”.22 In this way, the 
classics served not only as a trove of knowledge for the federalists to learn from, but they 
understood these texts as truth and therefore directly took ideas from the classics which they 
applied to their own task of constitution building.  
The first of these ideas which is referenced throughout the Federalist Papers is that 
republics should be governed by the best of a community. This idea has clear roots throughout 
the republican intellectual tradition. Niccolò Machiavelli held an aristocratic view of how liberty 
is to be maintained in republican government. He saw the best of the community, the nobles, as 
being able to best preserve liberty because of their detachment from passions of ambition, and 
therefore their focus is on maintaining the republic.23 Likewise, David Hume professed 
skepticism of “the lower sort of people” and their ability to discern what is good for the 
community in higher offices of republics.24 Thinkers in America echoed this republican desire to 
have the best among the community in positions of leadership. The Americans rejected any ideas 
 
20 Hamilton and Madison, Federalist 18.  
21 Hamilton, Federalist 9.  
22 Hamilton, Federalist 1.  
23 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 32. 
24 Hume, Selected Essays, 308. 
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of an entrenched aristocracy in favor of the idea of a “natural aristocracy”.25 This consisted of 
people in the community who were of exceptional ability and would therefore be able to govern 
and discern the good of the community most astutely.  
The federalists make abundantly clear that virtuous rule by the best of the community 
was an objective of theirs for their new constitution. Federalist no. 63 outlines clearly the need 
for the Senate to serve as the “enlightened” guardians of the public good in the face of the unruly 
passions of the people.26 This was a real point of emphasis for the federalists as enlightened rule 
was both a principle of republicanism, but was also something they perceived as being lacking in 
their own time. What both proponents of the Constitution and those against ratification saw was 
the inability of the people to identify the few that constituted the “natural aristocracy”, and 
therefore the people were not being led by those best able to discern the common good and rule 
with virtue, but were elevating demagogues in their place.27 This insistence on hierarchy to 
produce positive results was also a manifestation of the Publius’s view of human nature. The 
conventional view being that human nature was governed by reason, interest, and passion – 
virtue being the highest form of reason – therefore just as an individual must be governed by an 
internal hierarchy, so too must a community elevate those who could act in accordance with 
virtue in order for the community to be governed well.28 These ideas of human nature and of 
natural aristocracy informed their view of government and its overwhelming need to be ruled by 
the best of the community. Therefore, the federalists set out to create a government which could 
 
25 J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 515. 
26 Hamilton or Madison, Federalist 63. 
27 Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 516. 
28 Howe, “The Political Psychology of the Federalist”, 491, 500.  
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effectively filter through the passions of the many in favor of the maintenance of an over-arching 
common good.29 
The structure of the government that the framers created reflected their devotion to the 
idea of enlightened rule by the natural aristocracy of the community. The framers of the 
Constitution strengthened the offices most immune to the passions of the many, such as the 
senate, the president, and judiciary branch precisely because of their desire to ensure enlightened 
rule.30 The Senate acts as this check on passions within the legislative branch. Publius said that 
by selecting senators indirectly through state assemblies, the Senate “will in general be 
composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to presume that their 
attention and their votes will be directed to those men only who have become the most 
distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the people perceive just grounds for 
confidence”.31 Likewise, the electoral college serves the same function in selecting the president; 
by creating an impartial body, removed from influence of the people and self-interest, the 
framers were hoping to reinforce the idea of selection based on virtue rather than unruly 
passions.32 The indirect aspects of the institutions the framers created were meant to ensure rule 
by the best of the community, in line with what they saw as a foundational principle of 
republican thought.  
Rule by an enlightened few in the framer’s government was by no means intended to 
create a self-concerned, tyrannical, oligarchy. On the contrary, elevating the most virtuous of the 
 
29 Isaac Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion": The Discourse of Politics in 1787, In The William and Mary 
Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan., 1988), pp. 3-32., PDF 
file:///C:/Users/jonah/Downloads/Kramnick%20Discourse%20of%20Politics.pdf, 12-13. 
30 Howe, Political Psychology of the Federalists, 501. 
31 Jay, Federalist 64. 
32 Hamilton, Federalist 68.  
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community was intended to provide for an even more fundamental principle of republican 
government: the need for the government to discern and execute policies which are in the interest 
of a common good. The end of government was the procurement of a common good, and this 
idea was another that the federalists observed as true in the classical tradition, and therefore was 
an idea they sought to apply themselves. Niccolò Machiavelli establishes that a prudent follower 
of a republic is one who desires to serve not his own interests, but those of the common good.33 
With common good as the goal of a republic, it is also stated by those in the republican tradition, 
that a government must have checks that push people towards the pursuit of a common good and 
away from the private interests referenced by Machiavelli. David Hume picks up on this thread 
when he said that institutions of government must battle against the “depravity” of man, lest they 
bring the government to ruin.34 Indeed, virtues such as frugality and equality must be practiced 
by the community as a whole and reinforced by institutions, said Montesquieu, in order for a 
healthy republic to persist.35 The desire to serve the common good and civic virtue are not things 
necessarily inherent in individuals, so it is the role of good government to foster engagement in 
public life and provide for a common good.36 Republicanism, therefore, relies on government to 
turn the community towards the pursuit of common good as central to creating a healthy 
republic.  
The need to create and maintain a common good is not lost on the authors of the 
Federalist Papers and they make clear their insistence of government’s role in fostering a 
common good. Publius makes clear from the beginning in Federalist no. 2, that above all 
government ought to see the common good as its goal and that the states are at their best when 
 
33 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 45. 
34 Hume, Selected Essays, 20.  
35 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 44. 
36 Viroli, Republicanism, 14. 
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united under one union and the wisest among them are focused on maintaining this unity.37 
Federalist no. 6 picked up on this idea and stated “Commercial republics, like ours, will never be 
disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by 
mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord”.38 Significantly, what 
Publius demonstrated in this line, is the thought that the citizens of an American commercial 
republic must recognize their own interdependence in order to procure a common good. 
Individual contention, as Publius said, only leads to ruin, whereas concord and mutual interest 
can lead to overall communal well-being.  All this to say that  Publius’s desire for unity and 
communal good is crucial because it is how they conceive of a healthy republic functioning 
based on their understanding of previous republican doctrine and therefore they saw the need to 
instill these principles in their new government.  
The institutions of the framers’ government reflected their desire to create a sovereign 
power which was solely concerned with providing for a common good. The framers recognized 
the need for institutions to foster and protect the pursuit of a common good in the inability of the 
Articles of Confederation to adequately achieve this. The federal government was not strong 
enough to force individual states to comply to its policies, therefore states could act against the 
mandates of the whole with no fear of repercussions.39 This was a problem which, as is stated in 
Federalist no. 22, struck at the very heart of republican theory which relied on rule by the 
majority in perceiving the common good.40 Likewise, the framers saw the need for the federal 
government to possess the authority to direct the resources of the republic towards the pursuit of 
 
37 Jay, Federalist 2. 
38 Hamilton, Federalist 6.  
39 Andrew Shankman, Original Intents Hamilton, Madison, and the American Founding, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 14-15. 
40 Hamilton, Federalist 22. 
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a common good. Concerning taxation, Federalist no. 30 states the necessity that “the resources of 
the community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit of the Union”.41 It 
was in this context which the federalists saw the role of government in regulation. Its goal, in 
essence, was to ensure individual pursuit was still in line with what would benefit the community 
as a whole.42  
Finally, in the federalists’ strongest check against the self-interest destroying the common 
good, they took great care to emphasize sovereignty resting ultimately in the hands of the people. 
The ultimate need to be re-elected to keep power and the direct reliance of popular support in 
being selected to the House of Representatives was intended by the framers to ensure that 
representatives never forget what they are ultimately tasked with; the promotion of the common 
good.43 This, as well as the authority given to the new constitution, were all attempts to provide 
for the common good as the framers saw its crucial place in republican government.  
The federalists’ conception of government is representative of their understanding of the 
classics and is greatly informed by the republican intellectual tradition. With their understanding 
of the objectives of a republican government in place, the federalists also looked to tradition to 
perceive the potential pitfalls of a republican system.  
 
II. The Imperfection of Republican Government 
 
 
41 Hamilton, Federalist 30.  
42 Postell, Regulation During the American Founding, 89. 
43 Madison, Federalist 58; Jay, Federalist 64; Hamilton, Federalist 71. 
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In Federalist no. 9 Hamilton paints previous republics in history as having some fatal 
flaws which must be overcome in order to produce a stable government. Hamilton described 
republics of the past vacillating between extremes of anarchy and tyranny with few periods of 
stability interrupting the states of chaos. Licentiousness and tyranny existed on opposite ends of 
a spectrum. Licentiousness was a state of extreme liberty where individuals have no interests but 
their own and indulge their own self-interest to the extreme. Tyranny, conversely, was the loss of 
liberty at the hands of an individual or faction in power which exerts their own will arbitrarily 
over the citizenry. Luckily, in Hamilton’s eyes, the problems of classical republics were not so 
immutable as to be impossible to overcome, as he said “They are means, and powerful means, by 
which the excellences of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened 
or avoided”.44 Licentiousness and tyranny have been problems which thinkers throughout the 
republican tradition have had to wrestle with, and problems which the republics of history have 
failed to find concrete solutions for. With this as their basis, the federalists wanted to create a 
republic that could effectively resist both. Their institutional changes were therefore not 
antithetical to the republican tradition, but were meant to fix what had always been seen as the 
fatal flaws of republicanism. The debate was classical in scope and their solutions were meant to 
create a better republic. 
  Licentiousness was a problem that the framers first found themselves tasked with 
ameliorating if they wanted to create what they saw as a more perfect republic. Licentiousness is 
an obvious problem for republics, as they rely on the procurement and maintenance of a common 
good amongst its citizens. Publius saw this inability of authority to resist anarchy and 
licentiousness as a problem well-documented in its potential to cause the ruin of great republics. 
 
44 Hamilton, Federalist 9 
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Publius also observed licentiousness as being a flaw in the ancient Greek republics which 
contributed to their eventual fall to the Macedonians and later the Romans. Because the Greek 
states became so distracted by in-fighting, their confederacy fell apart, as each state was 
concerned in their own pursuits rather than in maintaining the confederacy.45 When this 
phenomenon manifests in individuals under a system of government not strong enough to corral 
their ambitions it can be equally damaging to republics. Montesquieu called this a state of 
“extreme equality”. In this state, each individual sees themselves as completely equal and there 
exists no regard for authority. The result is that individuals see themselves as their own sovereign 
authority, and therefore all semblance of common good is lost, as each individual sees their own 
conception of right as what is best.46 This represented a great problem in need of a solution for 
republican thinkers because to lose the pursuit of common good is to lose the very nature of 
republican government.  
The federalists’ fears of licentiousness, stemming from its place in classical tradition, was 
compounded by their observations of American life around them. What they saw was a nation 
which had waxed overly-revolutionary. The federalists saw the people to be too self-interested 
and beholden to their own passions for government to effectively promote a common good. 
What many of the federalists observed was an “excess of democracy” in the state legislatures as 
they felt they were overly-beholden to public opinion.47 In terms of republican theory, the state 
legislatures were not focusing on a common good but instead catering to the passions and 
interests of individuals. This would have also represented a breakdown in interdependence 
amongst citizens, another key aspect of a republican system. If everyone was pursuing their own 
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interests, then there was no recognition of communal good or communal dependence. It was also 
thought by some of the federalists that government had become hijacked by demagogues who 
were driven by their own ambition and had therefore turned their back on ruling through virtue 
and in the public interest.48 In essence, government was failing to adequately quell the ambition 
of individuals after the revolution and the federalists saw this as a threat to order and stability for 
the new union.  
 The Articles of Confederation’s inability to check ambition and steer the union away 
from the perils of extreme liberty was one of the main reasons licentiousness was taking hold in 
the United States. Licentiousness was one of the greatest factors which united Hamilton and 
Madison under the federalist cause. They were mutually concerned with creating a “durable 
liberty” which required a stronger federal government that could effectively unite individuals in 
the pursuit of common good.49 The Articles of Confederation possessed no such authority, and 
therefore the union was precipitously reliant on the voluntary cooperation of its members. 
Federalist no. 22 speaks of the ability of individual states to ruin federal treaties simply by 
choosing not to enforce them, therefore the “faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, 
are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every 
member of which it is composed”.50 This created a fear in the minds of the framers that stability 
in the republic was continuously at risk to the passions of individuals under the Articles and that 
left unchecked, licentiousness had the power to dissolve the newly formed union. 
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 Keeping these fears in mind, the federalists went about creating a national government 
which could effectively check what they perceived to be the unruly passions of the masses and 
instead provide for the common good. What the framers created was an essentially aristocratic 
government in order to check the democratic tendencies they saw all around them.51 In creating a 
government that was less responsive to the passions of individuals, the framers hoped to avoid 
the problems of demagoguery they were seeing in the states and elsewhere.52  
The specific institution that best reflects this desire of the framers to separate passions 
from governance is the Senate. As there are only two senators per state, they are responsible for 
considerably more constituents than those in the House of Representatives, and are therefore 
more detached from local interests. This was done in the hopes that they will not be as likely to 
“yield to the impulse and sudden violent passions” of individuals and communities.53 Another 
broader fix to this problem of licentiousness was to make laws handed down by the federal 
government directly applicable to individuals. In making law apply directly, as Publius in 
Federalist no. 16 stated, the federal government’s authority is not dependent on the whims of 
individual states, but is binding, thereby eliminating the ability of states to reject common 
measures in favor of their own interests.54 These fixes were manifestations of the federalists’ fear 
that unchecked interest was fatal to republics as well as a recognition that only a government 
imbued with adequate authority could avoid the dangers of licentiousness.  
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The fears over licentiousness drove the framers to create a government vested with 
enough authority to resist the passions of the masses. However, this process of establishing a 
strong government was a double-edged sword. A government too weak could not effectively 
prevent licentiousness, but a government that is too strong ran the risk of tyranny.  
The fear of tyranny was consistent amongst republican thinkers of the past and it was 
certainly something the federalists wanted to prevent in their republic. Tyranny was understood 
by republican thinkers and the federalists to be arbitrary interference at the will of another or of a 
faction. Conversely, liberty would be the assurance that citizens of a republic are not subject to 
arbitrary interference or domination at the hands of an individual or faction.55 Tyranny has the 
power to undermine republican values and is just as dangerous as licentiousness in its ability to 
cripple republics because tyranny also represents a departure from pursuit of the common good. 
It is for this reason that classical historians spent so much time discussing military and political 
subjects. It is because they were chiefly concerned with figuring out what causes tyranny, and 
how they could learn from the past to prevent it in their own time.56 The federalists recognized 
this, and Publius said in Federalist no. 22 that “history furnishes us with so many mortifying 
examples of the prevelancy” of republics being undone by leaders who turn away from the 
interest of the public in order to wield power to benefit themselves.57  
The federalist framers, being students of the republican tradition, adopted these fears of 
tyranny. They saw the Articles of Confederation as being equally inept at preventing 
licentiousness as they did potential tyranny. The relative weakness of the federal Constitution 
allowed for licentiousness through its inability to force states to comply to its mandates, but it 
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also opened the door for tyranny in the ability for states to exercise powers that they did not 
possess. Publius noted in Federalist no. 22 that tyranny had sprung more often from assumptions 
of power under a weak constitution, than from the authority of strong constitutions exercised 
fully.58 Likewise, power was too concentrated under the Articles. Legislative, judicial, and 
executive powers were all vested in the legislature, prompting Publius to observe through the 
words of Thomas Jefferson that “concentrating these in the same hands, is precisely the 
definition of despotic government”.59 It was the relative weakness to prevent power grabs 
coupled with the lack of checks on concentrated authority which caused the federalists to fear the 
Articles lacked the capacity to effectively prevent tyranny.  
The federalists were not the only thinkers who were concerned with the threat of tyranny 
to a republic, but the individuals who were opponents of the Constitution also expressed their 
desire to eliminate the potential for tyranny in the new government. What was especially 
concerning to these opponents was the thought that the Constitution of the federalists had swung 
the pendulum too far on the scale of authority, and that the result was something resembling a 
permanent aristocracy.60 Their fears of aristocracy, however, were not wholly incompatible with 
the federalists’ views on aristocracy’s role in government. Opponents of the Constitution did not 
fear the rule of the natural aristocracy, but were worried about a hereditary oligarchy taking hold. 
In creating a distant and powerful Senate, the federalists had provoked oppositional cries to 
balance its power with a lower house which was equally strong, and therefore be able to check 
the body which those against ratification saw as most susceptible to tyranny through the 
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establishment of a permanent aristocracy.61 However, those on both sides of this debate held 
conceptions of liberty which largely lined up. They both saw the achievement of liberty through 
the limiting of potential for arbitrary power, but also believed that there are areas of life which 
government has legitimate authority to control, and that powers which are legitimate should be 
strong enough for government to be effective.62 This, arguably, is exactly what the federalists 
sought to do in finding a balance between extremes of licentiousness and tyranny. 
With arguments of some antifederalists in mind, as well as the long tradition of tyranny’s 
threat to republicanism, the federalists were tasked with explaining how their new government 
was to be resistant to tyranny. Consequently, the framers designed each aspect of government 
with the fear of tyranny in mind. More broadly, the federalists – especially Madison – recognized 
that tyranny could be sourced from factions or individuals but also from the majority of 
citizens.63 Therefore, the government sought to both protect the rule of the majority while still 
protecting the rights of those in the minority.64 More specifically, the framers baked in a 
resistance to tyranny in the Constitution through the separation of powers and the assurance of 
sovereignty resting in the hands of the people. As stated before, the concentration of all powers 
within one body was the federalists’ definition of despotism. Therefore, the Constitution 
separates these powers into different branches of government so that each can check and balance 
one another.65 This disallowed any one part of government from wielding power in an unchecked 
way.  
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This same line of thinking also caused the framers to vest sovereignty amongst the people 
as a whole. If the government owes its existence to the authority of the people and is dependent 
on them to remain in power, then they must act in a way that is conducive to the common good 
or else lose their power altogether.66 Publius laid out the difficulty of corrupting a body such as 
the Senate because of the complex and counter-balanced system the framers created. For the 
Senate to institute tyranny it would have to itself become corrupt, then corrupt the state 
legislatures to keep them in power. Then, the people likewise would need to be corrupted lest the 
state legislatures lose their power, and finally the House of Representatives would need to be 
equal in this tyrannical plot because of their equal share in legislative power.67 All this to say, the 
framers’ fears of tyranny drove them to create a system with so many checks that authority could 
not be wielded in capriciousness. 
The very recognition of the dangers of licentiousness and tyranny can be observed in 
republics throughout history and were equally present in the Federalist Papers. Thus, the 
federalists sought to employ solutions that they saw as ways to create a more perfect republic. 
Therefore, what manifests as the federalists’ most novel invention in their Constitution still rests 
on republican thought. It is only after the federalists’ republican conception of government’s 
function was established and their solutions to classically republican problems solved, that the 
framers were free to innovate and adapt republican government so that it could adequately be 
applied to the American system.  
 
 
III. An American Virtue 
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What the federalists created in the American Constitution can certainly be called a new 
brand of republicanism. To remove the classical republican aspects of the framers’ work, 
however, is to fundamentally misrepresent their thinking. Their new visions of virtue and the 
individual was not an abandonment of common good and republican values, but were both 
efforts to create a more durable kind of virtue and a government that was more capable in 
accomplishing the goal of creating and maintaining a common good. What the framers of the 
American republic attempted to do was capture these positive effects of a system built off virtue 
institutionally, thereby removing the reliance in past republics on individuals to bring virtue into 
the system of government. What this did was redefine an individual’s relationship with 
governance and create a new kind of virtue within the American republic. However, these 
developments still must be viewed within a republican context. The framers innovated within 
this framework to create a more durable form of republican government which could function in 
the United States. 
Virtue’s place within republican intellectual history cannot be understated, as it is seen as 
the animating factor of republicanism throughout its history. Montesquieu identifies the spirit of 
republicanism as “love of one’s homeland” which then leads to a desire to serve it.68 
Republicanism placed reliance on virtue because of its ability to motivate individuals to subvert 
their own needs to those of the community.69 It is this desire to serve publicly which drove 
republican government because of the way in which it drove citizens to participate in 
government and sustain it. Therefore, in a system based on virtue, the individual is only ever 
referenced in their capacity to serve the common good. In other words, the worth of an individual 
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is measured according to their contribution to the overall health of the community.70 Aristotle 
said that in order to become fully realized as a human individuals must be engaged in politics, as 
that is the only activity which provides adequate meaning to one’s life.71 Therefore, virtue 
creates a system that definitively ties individuals to their community. Individuals are not only 
supposed to act in virtue but are meant to play an active role in ensuring the government is 
focused solely on virtuous rule as well. The thought was that representatives would become 
vulnerable to corrupting forces while in power, therefore it is necessary for them to return to 
their constituents, by means of reelection. Then, their constituents would remind them why they 
are ruling and on what principles – virtue – they must stand.72 In this way, it was the virtue 
within each citizen which was the check to corruption in republics. The system relied on an 
active and virtuous society made up of engaged citizens for the health of the republic. This is 
what the federalists would have known about the prominence of virtue in a republican system 
and how virtue had been presented in the existing republican tradition. 
With the intense focus on the public good as the goal of republics built on virtue there 
existed is a need in the mind of previous republican thinkers for the citizenry to have a shared 
perception of what the common good is. Therefore, the thought for much of the intellectual 
tradition of republicanism is that republics can only exist in small, homogeneous communities. 
This idea operated on the need for individuals to all perceive the common good in the same way, 
though there may exist slight differences between citizens on how to obtain a common good, 
they were still viewing the same common good just through different eyes.73 Montesquieu 
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echoed this sentiment when describing the size of republics in reference to their overall health. 
He stated that republics work well being based in virtue, but can only work in small states, 
because of the need for a unified education to instill in its citizenry the same view of virtue.74 He 
continued later in his work and said larger republics cause citizens to develop varying interests 
which serve to drive people away from the essential principles of virtue, thereby undoing the 
republic.75 The thinkers of the American founding were split on this issue. The federalists 
ultimately split from tradition, opting instead for a diverse and large republic, whereas some 
antifederalist intellectuals stayed consistent to the republican tradition, thinking a small, 
homogeneous republic to be best.  
Arguments from some antifederalist points of view echoed these arguments that republics 
must be centered on small, homogeneous communities. Their vision of government existed 
locally because of this classical emphasis on the necessity of a communal ethos. They first 
objected on the grounds that a large, disinterested state, could never account for the diversity of 
needs throughout the United states, therefore power needed to rest more locally to truly reflect 
the common good of communities.76 However, even more egregious in the eyes of these 
opponents to the Constitution was the fact that the new government did not promote a shared 
vision of morality. Just as with republics of the past, they thought government should act as an 
example of communal morality.77 They especially desired religion to fill this void and unite the 
country under one school of thought. Most notably, Samuel Adams envisioned America being 
organized as “Christian Sparta”; a state with a communal morality and a strict focus on the good 
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of the community over that of individual citizens.78 These arguments were classic in nature and 
reflected the insistence in the classical tradition for a shared sense of virtue which could unite 
individuals in pursuit of a common good. 
The federalists were not convinced of the need for communal homogeneity. Instead, they 
insisted that republics could function in the opposite extreme through a multiplicity of interests. 
Where previous thinkers had rejected private interests as mere passions that destroyed republics, 
Publius reconceptualized interests as rational, and therefore affirmed their place in human 
experience.79 Consequently, private interests would need to be accounted for in their new 
republic. As Madison described in Federalist no. 10, there are two methods to mitigating the 
dangers of interest-based factions, which are eliminating their causes or their effects. To 
eliminate factions’ causes would be to destroy the liberty that allows them to flourish. Therefore, 
the only reasonable remedy is to try to limit the dangers of its effects. For Publius, the way to 
achieve this is to multiply exponentially the amount of interests so that no specific one can 
dominate on their own, therefore the only thing left for differently interested groups to agree on 
is a common good.80 This idea from Publius represents a clear understanding of private interests 
and that these exist alongside virtue, which made traditional models of the small, homogeneous 
republics insufficient in accounting for the diversity of interests that would exist in the American 
republic.  
The acceptance of interests within the American republic was unique, but it is only an 
aspect of the truly revolutionary shift in republican thought that the American framers ushered in 
with the creation of the Constitution. They acknowledged that individuals did not always act 
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with virtue in mind, and therefore they removed virtue as the necessary component to their 
republic. Publius said in Federalist no. 51 that if men were angels, no government would be 
necessary; yet men are not, and therefore government cannot rely on the hope that men always 
act in virtue.81 Though the capacity for virtue existed in Publius’s conception of human nature, 
interests and passions were coequal parts. What is worse, is that the hierarchy of human nature 
which Publius saw as leading to virtue – rationality, then interests, then passions – was inverted 
in the minds of men when they were exposed to the corrupting influence of power.82 
Compounding this problem, the federalists generally perceived a drop in virtue amongst 
American citizens in comparison to their ancient counterparts. It was precisely because of the 
framers’ recognition of private, especially commercial, interests that they saw the martial aspects 
of classical virtue as especially incompatible with the American paradigm. Hamilton said in 
Federalist 24 that the continued mustering of militias would cause more harm than good, as it 
would cause individuals to be removed from their family and industry for long periods of time, 
thereby hurting the public through lost productivity and hurting private industry.83 This 
represented a rejection of martial manifestations of interdependence on the part of the framers.  It 
is because of this perceived drop in virtue amongst the American citizenry in conjunction with 
the framers’ recognition of private interests that Gordon Wood says the framers set out to create 
a system that was “no longer founded in virtue”.84 To remove virtue as a central ingredient in 
their republic was remarkable considering virtue’s privileged position in republics throughout 
history.  
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However, this was not a complete abandonment of virtue on the part of the framers. 
There was still room in the American republic for people of virtue, and the system still benefited 
from these types of people. Essentially, virtue became federalized in the sense that the leaders 
were still meant to rule through virtuous means, but the everyday citizenry lost their active role. 
However, the aspect of virtue that the framers valued and wanted to capture was its effects and 
its role creating a common good, not the reliance of each member of society to bring virtue to the 
system through their civic engagement. The system of checks, balances, and separations of 
powers were built into the federal structure by the framers so that interests could flourish without 
corrupting the system.85 Where a republic based in virtue would rely on the virtue of its citizens 
to check unruly ambitions of those in power, this American system sought to divide government 
so that should one piece become corrupted, it would not cause the ruin of the whole, but the other 
pieces of government could resist corruption because of their coequal powers. Madison praises 
the American “compound republic” in its ability to resist the corrupting aspects of interests by 
dividing itself into multiple departments which check one another and are likewise checked 
themselves.86 No one branch can govern independently, and therefore the need to find common 
ground is engrained into the federal structure resulting in a republic which does not rely on virtue 
to overcome interests, but institutionally forces competing groups to govern collaboratively in 
pursuit of a common good.  
In a system, designed by the federalists, that no longer relies on individuals to provide 
virtue, there is room for a new type of individual within the American public. This new mode of 
republicanism also created a new definition of virtue and a restructuring of the relationship 
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between individuals and virtue in the community. What this system did was essentially make the 
individual irrelevant in terms of their own civic agency; rather, a system un-reliant on virtue 
viewed citizens in an undifferentiated mass in terms of their public contributions.87 This loss of 
individual civic agency was offset by gains made in the expansion of private life and the 
embracing of interests under the American republic. This can only be labeled as a new brand of 
republicanism because the very nature of government changed through the framers’ recognition 
of individual interest in their system. Where the end of classical republics was the procurance of 
communal political freedom, political freedom was the means of the American republic to 
achieve an end of private well-being.88 This restructuring of republican thought was truly 
revolutionary by the framers as it created a model of republicanism that could still achieve the 
essential goals of republicanism (i.e. rule of the majority in the interest of a common good) 
without depriving individuals of a private existence to sustain the community.  
Thus, the American republic was built to account for the individual and did not wholly 
rely on virtue. However, the rhetoric of virtue was not lost in America. Despite the diminishing 
role of virtue in the public sphere, virtue took on a different meaning privately. The virtuous 
individual was still seen in their ability to contribute to the overall welfare of the community, but 
this was no longer a product of civic engagement, but a measure of one’s economic activity.89 
Economic activity is naturally a self-interested activity, but thinkers in the early American 
republic recognized its potential to produce virtue. Jefferson echoed previous republican thinkers 
in his praise of the yeoman farmer, who’s industry, in their view, contributed to individual 
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virtues such as temperance and moderation which made them productive members of their 
community.90 
What this shift in virtue represents was not a rejection of virtue, but rather an 
acknowledgment of self-interest’s place in a society. Essentially, the federalists’ restructuring of 
virtue was more a move of pragmatism than a rejection of the classical tradition. In order to 
preserve the spirit of republicanism in its quest for common good, the framers had to account for 
or even embrace self-interest or else see their republic become crippled by individual interests in 
the same way past republics had. A common good was still obtainable even in a system built to 
allow private interests to flourish. Hamilton, in Federalist no. 35 outlined how this could work; 
he said that individuals in different industries should possess the recognition that their own well-
being was tied to the well-being of those in other industries. He said, “Will not the merchant 
understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of the mechanic 
and manufacturing arts, to which his commerce is so nearly allied?”.91 Through this recognition 
of mutual dependency amongst citizens, Publius believed that the need to pursue a common good 
would never be forgotten in the American republic. Now the manifestation of interdependency 
would be in set in economic terms rather than necessitating war to be maintained. Hamilton 
clearly believed that interdependence would not be lost in this system, just that it would be seen 
in an economic context. Therefore, the framers’ encouragement of commerce and specialization 
can be understood in the context of attempting to create a more durable and dynamic form of 
virtue, one which could account for self-interest while still fostering a common good.92  This is 
the essence of Madison’s Federalist no. 10; that factions may compete in favor of their own 
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interests, but by allowing a multiplicity of interests no one can dominate, and therefore what can 
be agreed upon is the common good.93 This self interest was still different from that of liberalism 
in the sense that it both recognized interdependence among individuals as well as the necessity of 
a common good.  
The development of private interests and a private sector under the American republic is 
inseparable from a classically republican context. It is only in the pursuit of a better, more stable 
conception of virtue that a private life is formed in the American republic. The fact that virtue 
does not leave the rhetoric of American life even though the framers removed it as central to 
their system was a testament to the republican disposition of American intellectuals. Private life 
and industry, though more commonly referenced as evidence of America’s founding as 
fundamentally liberal, is therefore a misrepresentation of what the framers were trying to 
accomplish. It is only through the attempt to create a more durable republic that the framers 
arrived at these new conceptions of individual rights and privatized virtue. The American 
founding was set in republican terms and is subsequently a byproduct of the framers working to 
apply republican ideas in a way that suits American life.  
 
 Though historians have argued over the intellectual legacy of the framers, the American 
republic is a product of the intellectual history of republicanism. The framers of the American 
Republic were educated in republican theory and their ideas and rhetoric are colored by their 
republican background. Their goal of fostering a common good and the government’s role in 
creating it rings republican. Federalist fear of licentiousness and tyranny are based in past 
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republics’ inability to resist them, therefore resulting in their ruin. Even the federalist view of 
virtue, though augmented in their model of republicanism, is a response to how they observed 
virtue in past republics. Removing republican thought as the framers’ intellectual basis in 
creating the Constitution is a mischaracterization of how their ideas came to be. The American 
republic was built on the republican intellectual tradition and the framers applied republican 
thought to their own contemporary government.  
The significance of understanding the American framers and their republican influence is 
essential to understanding American political thought. In modifying republicanism as they did, 
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, fundamentally changed republican theory. The necessity of 
updating classical models of republicanism to suit the American paradigm illustrated the 
framers’ recognition that they were not perfect. Therefore, changes had to be made for a republic 
to persist in America. However, the fact that the framers nonetheless insisted on their 
government being a republic demonstrates the value they saw in the classical models. Though 
existing republican theory could not be applied perfectly to the American system, it was clearly 





















A Liberal Conception of The American Republic: 
How American Ideology Augments Government Structure 
 
 
With the basis that the American republic is founded on republican ideals, the 
juxtaposition of how a liberal ideology is applied to our American system can be examined. In 
popular understanding of American governance, the discussion is always set in liberal 
terminology. I was not exposed to republicanism as a school of thought until college, and that 
was largely because of my own interest in the subject and being a history major. This means the 
majority of Americans have no real conception of what it means to live in a republic other than 
institutional aspects. In this, the animating spirit of republicanism is lost, and as was 
demonstrated previously, that is a crucial aspect of the system. Instead, liberalism has become 
the common creed of America’s social ideology. I am not saying this is a bad thing as certainly 
liberalism has numerous positive contributions to our way of life. The protection of life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of property are clearly things that improved the lives of individuals in America. 
However, the application of liberal ideology to a fundamentally republican system is bound to, 
and has, created problems. The relationship between liberalism and republicanism in America 
has produced interesting dynamics in American life that are observable today. In a moment such 
as ours where large portions of the American populace are realizing the seeming inabilities of 
our system to work for everyone it is important to examine why this may be the case. By 
examining how liberalism has been applied in America, and where it has come in conflict with 
our republican roots, we may be able to see how the tensions and problems which exist today 
may stem from.  
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 The solution to any of the problems observed in America is not to adopt solely a 
republican system and reject liberalism, nor is it the opposite. If republicanism and liberalism 
existed on two opposite ends of an ideological spectrum, then I see our answer existing 
somewhere in the middle. However, what I have observed is that American ideology has lies 
primarily at the liberal extreme of the spectrum. Again, this is not in itself a negative, but the fact 
is that we live under a system of government which is foundationally republican, and this creates 
tension. No tension is greater in American life than the divide between public and private life. 
This tension itself is a manifestation of the divide between the republicanism and liberalism 
dichotomy, as republicanism is a largely community-oriented system whereas liberalism is 
almost solely focused on the individual. The exploration of the relationships between public and 
private, the individual and the community, and republicanism and liberalism are the central 
relationships explored in this paper. They will help us examine the central question of how we 
can effectively apply liberal ideology to our republican system in such a way that we can reap 
the best of both ideologies.  
 Formally, this paper will mirror my preceding work on the republican basis of the 
American founding. However, in this paper rather than just exploring how republican ideology 
informed the choices of the American framers, I will explore how our contemporary liberal 
interpretation of the framers’ work has fundamentally changed how our American system, as it is 
manifested today, is different from the one imagined by the framers. Also useful in the analysis 
in this paper will be the use of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. This is a text 
written about Tocqueville’s tour of the United States in the 1830s. His account of his 
observations will be useful in the sense that it allows us to see the beginning of liberal ideology 
sweeping the nation. Tocqueville’s tour seemed to take place at a moment when there were still 
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republican sentiments clearly alive in the American republic, but where an undercurrent of 
liberalism was clearly also beginning to take hold of American ideology. His analysis will be 
useful in assessing our own time in reference to the early American republic.  
 In beginning this dive into the complex relationship between republicanism and 
liberalism it may be beneficial to return to some operational definitions of these ideologies. 
Republicanism is a political theory concerned with maintaining the political liberty of the 
community through the virtue of its citizens as a recognition of their interdependence. Therefore, 
republicanism is chiefly concerned with providing for the common good and in is focused not on 
the individual, but the community at large. Liberalism, conversely, is a political theory which 
states the chief objective of a political community as the protection of life, liberty, and the 
property of its individual members.94 Liberalism’s focus is on the community only in reference 
to its ability to allow individual freedom and liberty. These definitions do not speak to the 
intricacies of either system, however they will allow us to form a basis of understanding to begin 
to explore the relationship between them at length.  
 
Liberal Interpretations of the Foundations of Government 
 
 The superimposition of liberalism on the work of the framers both misrepresents what the 
framers saw as the basis of government as well as changes what contemporary Americans see as 
the fundamental goal of government. For the framers, that was collective security and liberty, for 
liberal thinkers, it is individual security and liberty. Understanding this initial divide will help us 
 
94 Viroli, Republicanism, 58. 
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to further understand how both traditions view leadership and their concepts of the common 
good. 
As we begin further exploring the divide between the thought of the framers and liberal 
thinkers, it is important to first acknowledge the threat that liberalism poses to the work of the 
framers. Liberalism was not a comprehensive ideology at the time the framers were constructing 
the United States constitution. The first liberal ideas were around, and the framers certainly knew 
them. John Locke published his famous second treatise in 1689, therefore well before the 
formation of the constitution, and the framers almost directly quote in The Declaration of 
Independence with their insistence on the importance of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness”. However, the term “liberalism” as it is understood as a political ideology did not 
begin to be used until the early 19th century.95 Therefore, when the framers were incorporating 
ideas of personal liberty and the idea of the individual, it was not a total adoption of a liberal 
philosophy, but a something they saw as adding to their republican system. This is important 
because if liberalism did not exist in the way in which it does today, therefore there is no way the 
framers could have adequately accounted for its effect on their government. Had they been able 
to predict liberalism’s profound impact on American ideology, they may have been more explicit 
in their insistence on a republican basis for their government. However, as it stands, it is 
important to analyze how the framers viewed the role of government in contrast to what later 
liberal thinkers have described as government’s basis.   
As discussed previously, the basis of republican government is the political freedom of 
the community at large, and the individuals of the community act in virtue to protect this because 
 
95 Kirchner, Emil. Liberal parties in Western Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 2. 
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of their recognition of shared dependence. At the risk of belaboring this point, it is important to 
understand the sense of shared duty individuals in a republic feel, because it differs from the type 
of unity that exists in liberalism. In republics, the only goal of an individual was demonstrating 
virtue in service of the community. The government acted with communal interests at the heart 
of their decisions as well, doing whatever was necessary to protect the community. In the context 
of ancient republics this often meant war. However, this pervasive focus on communally 
motivated virtue explains the eagerness often displayed by ancient citizens to go to war, as it was 
an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to the community. I think it is safe to say that 
we as a contemporary nation do not want war as a common part of society and that was rightly 
left out of the DNA of our republic by the framers. However, I believe the framers still believed 
that a devotion to one’s community would be present even without war that would motivate 
individuals to act with their community in mind. Instead, this is where liberalism has 
complicated the relationship between an individual and their community under our modern 
system.  
In contrast with republicanism, liberalism is focused on the good of the individual. The 
community is a way to ensure individual liberty and security rather than a common focus for 
individuals. This reverses the relationship between an individual and their community outlined in 
republican thought, and this often creates an adversarial relationship today between individuals 
and the broader community. Policies which are intended to procure collective good may be 
opposed by individuals because they feel they infringe on their own liberty. This is not a concern 
in republican thought because what is for the good of the community is the good of everyone. 
Yet, that is not seen the same way today in America, individuals cling to their own liberty and 
see any attempt to limit it as an attack from the community. A tangible example is the debate 
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over the second amendment. The actual text of the amendment demonstrates the communal focus 
of the framers as the right to bear arms in their capacity “as a member of a well-regulated 
militia”. Yet, in liberal political discourse it is interpreted as an individual right, that should it be 
limited in any way, is a breach of the fundamental freedom of an individual. I am not 
commenting on the validity of either argument, I am merely pointing out the fundamentally 
different interpretations of the role of community and government under republicanism and 
liberalism.  
What is concerning in liberal thought in terms of American government is the hostility it 
creates between the community and individuals. Republicanism fosters a collective goal which 
individuals strive for as part of a broader community of equally motivated citizens set on 
providing for a common good. Liberalism fragments the community because of its individual 
focus and makes the community valuable only in its capacity to meet the needs of each 
individual. This is not a sustainable model as there is no way a community can possibly account 
for the needs of every member of a community, and the result is reminiscent of what we see 
today, which is mass loss of faith in the community and individuals retreating from the 
community to their own individualistic desires. To tie this into the framing of the United States 
government, the framers could not have wanted a society structured around disinterested 
individuals, as the system they created is a participatory republic. 
What causes this divide between republicanism and liberalism is their base conceptions 
of what liberty means, as both see liberty as a goal, and in understanding how each conceive of 
liberty this divide may be able to be bridged to find a middle ground. The difference is between 
positive and negative liberty. Positive liberty is the freedom to do something, whereas negative 
liberty is freedom from interference. Ancient republics only had positive freedom and it was 
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manifested in their service to their community. In this sense, the ancient citizen was free to live 
their life to the fullest within the confines of their system. They lacked negative freedom in the 
sense that any imposition that the government made in restricting what an individual could do 
was legitimate. In other words, there was no check on the ability of the community to dictate the 
lives of its individual members, so long as everyone in the community saw their lives as affected 
equally it was fair. The development of negative liberty is a much needed and valuable 
development in contemporary understanding of liberty. We, as Americans, have set limits on 
which “inalienable” rights cannot be infringed upon. We also have positive liberty as we are free 
to pursue a good life within the American system. Therefore, in modern America we should be 
able to embrace the positive liberty that republicanism promotes while also adopting the negative 
liberty of liberalism which protects us as individuals. However, the problem is we have swung 
too far in terms of negative liberty where many Americans view any limitation of liberty as an 
attack on their basic rights as an individual. I think in returning to some aspects of positive 
liberty we may be able to more effectively promote the common good that the framers saw as so 
crucial in their system while still maintaining the important check of negative liberty. These two 
ideas do not have to be at odds, but only in the recognition of the emphasis liberalism has put on 
negative liberty over positive liberty, can we return to a more balance system.  
An equally fundamental question that causes tension between republicanism and liberalism is 
the question of who should govern. Republicanism stresses the importance of elevating the best 
of the community to rule. This is good in the sense it attempts to place those most able to govern 
in positions of power, however it is problematic in its elitist connotations. Liberalism augments 
the idea of leadership because of its emphasis on the equality of individuals. If under liberalism, 
everyone is their own equally capable individual, then reason stands to follow that everyone is 
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capable of leadership. The drawback of this reasoning is that it makes it easier for those the 
framers referred to as demagogues to gain power and attacks intellectualism at a fundamental 
level. Again, the best leadership lies between these extremes of a strictly liberal or republican 
system.   
 The positives of a detached and intellectually driven ruling class are outlined previously 
as laid out by the framers. However, what has not been discussed is the extent to which this is an 
extremely elitist view. By saying there are a limited number of people in any community suited 
to lead and lead well republicanism assumes very little of the capacity of the “masses”. This also 
makes republicanism a less-democratic system. Elite rule exists in republican government in 
order to ensure the masses are not being led astray from the common good, but that in itself 
assumes that the majority of the community is not able to properly discern what is best for the 
whole.  It is true that republican citizens have been deceived by a candidate who is able to speak 
well, but these examples are surely outliers in the history of republics. A certain degree of 
responsiveness by elected officials should be in place, and is something that certainly us as 
moderns see as extremely valuable in government.  
Another aspect of elite rule overlooked by the framers, but that is certainly a reality of 
modernity, is the extent to which those who already have power in other sectors of life are the 
ones who gain power politically. This is especially true of money in American politics. Those 
who are economically powerful have an outsized voice in politics both in influence and ability to 
run for office. According to an article written in 2012, the average contributions for candidates 
running for the House of Representatives was $1,689,580.96 This number only increases as you 
 
96 Aliyah Frumin, “How much does it cost to win a seat in Congress? If you have to ask…”, MSNBC, (March 10, 
2013). Accessed: http://www.msnbc.com/hardball/how-much-does-it-cost-win-seat-congre 
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move higher in the government. The problem with this is that the House, which by the framers 
own design was supposed to be the most democratic element of their government, is still 
incredibly out of reach for the average American financially. This means the only ones running 
are those who are already powerful, thereby reinforcing their position as a member of the elite.  
Liberalism, in contrast, encourages a distinctly more egalitarian view of governance. 
Tocqueville speaks of the beauty of equality in America as he says the seeds of aristocracy are 
not sown in America as it is in other countries, and this allows citizens to have a greater 
influence than ever before in the affairs of government.97 This is certainly a good thing, by 
breaking down the hierarchical nature of previous thought of humanity, liberal ideology certainly 
allowed more people to become active members of their community politically. This, of course, 
was extremely limited in actuality in the time Tocqueville toured America, yet in theory the 
liberal ideal of individual agency was something that could break down previously existing 
social distinctions and make it easier for non-elite members of society to achieve political power.  
While liberalism discourages the elite view of republican governance, it certainly makes 
it easier for the framers’ fear of demagogues to be realized in American government. The 
insistence in liberal ideology of absolute individual agency breaks down the bonds between 
citizens as well as dilutes expertise in government. In the midst of describing the beauty of 
equality in America, Tocqueville also speaks of its ability to divide. The static nature of 
hierarchical society ties individual together as a recognition of their interdependence whereas 
democratic societies encourage individualism and thereby sever the links between citizens. 
Tocqueville says that this “dries up the source of public virtues”.98 In relating this to leadership 
 
97 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, (The Library of America, New York: 2004), 52. 
98 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 585-586 
44 
 
under liberal ideology, it increases the likelihood that leaders will not keep their focus on the 
common good, but pursue power for their own benefit. The goal of the framers’ system was to 
create a government detached enough from interests to be able to pursue the common good. 
However, if liberalism breaks down the sense of duty to pursue a common good, then there is 
nothing left for elected officials to pursue but their own gain. In creating a system that only looks 
inward for individuals, liberalism creates governance by demagogues.  
Besides the danger of self-interested rulers, liberalism also strikes at the very heart of 
what is supposed to make participatory government so great: discernment through deliberation. 
This is often hailed as the hallmark of a democratic system, that citizens may come together to 
work collectively to solve problems in ways that benefit them all. However, the emphasis put on 
individual capability and agency of every individual dilutes this aspect of democratic 
governance. For Tocqueville, individualism both encourages new thinking, but also creates a sort 
of servitude to the whims of the majority. Individuals in a relatively equal system judge 
themselves to be their own best judges of what is right. Because they are on equal footing with 
their fellow citizens, then they assume a relatively equal ability of everyone else to come to 
logical conclusions of their own. Therefore, individuals are left with no objections to the desires 
of the majority, as they differ to its conclusions.99 This system assumes enlightened participation 
of individual citizens, yet it crushes the deliberative aspects of democratic governance which are 
supposed to bolster its effectiveness. This may seem counterintuitive, but consider how potent 
public opinion can be on guiding policy. Even things not based in fact are accepted and acted 
upon today simply because it is found in a “reliable” source, or distributed broadly. In leadership, 
 
99 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 491 
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it is best to have individuals in place who are intellectual and deliberative in nature, and these are 
the individuals the framers wanted as well.  
The extremes of liberal and republican thought in terms of what constitutes effective 
leadership both hold negative aspects. The elitism of a classically republican conception bars 
large portions of the population from participating in governance. Yet, the liberal system of 
extreme equality in capacity to govern also cripples the effectiveness of government. Therefore, 
this is another example of where modern American government should work to blend the two. 
Policies such as civil service exams and protection are a step in this direction. They are inclusive 
in that anyone can enter the program as well as secure in the fact they are attempts to ensure 
individuals who can govern effectively are the ones given the opportunity to lead.  
 
Liberal Insistence on the Threat of Tyranny 
 
 
The problems of licentiousness and tyranny, as discussed previously, are clearly 
problems which the framers went to great lengths to ameliorate in their republic. As with the 
foundations of government, these are aspects of the American system which are complicated 
with the addition of liberalism. The problem of licentiousness I see as being particularly 
amplified by liberal ideology. The intense focus on the individual apparent in liberal ideology 
would seem to make a state of licentiousness even easier to devolve into. The problem of 
tyranny, however, seems to allow for some common ground between republicanism and 
liberalism. Both ideologies wish to protect against and rid themselves of arbitrary interference, 
and through this common desire to guard the community against tyranny there may be room to 
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strike a balance on authority in such a way to adhere to both liberal and republican fears of 
tyranny. These fears are something addressed consistently by the framers of the American 
constitution and the solutions they devised were from a republican perspective, therefore to 
understand how liberalism has shaped these issues in American government today it must be 
through the lens of how liberalism shapes our own understanding of what the framers created to 
solve these problems.  
Licentiousness, as defined previously, is a state of extreme self-interest where individuals 
possess no regard for anything but their own desires. This represented an obvious threat to 
republicanism for the framers as it goes against all that republicanism stands for. In a licentious 
state there is no common good, virtue, or recognition of interdependence. The framers’ solution 
to this was as ideological as it was institutional. Ideologically the framers fell back on republican 
tradition in the hopes of resisting licentiousness. The encouraging of virtue and of recognizing 
citizens’ interdependence were crucial in keeping a communal perception for the framers. 
Institutionally, the framers created aspects of the government meant to resist the self-interests of 
the many. As discussed previously, the senate and president were supposed to be lofty and 
untouchable positions so that they could focus on the common good. Underscoring the framers’ 
response to the dangers of licentiousness was their desire to vest enough authority in the 
government they were creating in order to resist individual ambition. This was evident in the 
framers’ critiques of the Articles of Confederation, as they felt it did not have the power to force 
compliance of the individual states. It was obviously a point of emphasis for the framers to create 
a system resistant to the perils of licentiousness and its ability to divide their republic. 
Liberalism undermines the efforts of the framers to guard against licentiousness. 
Specifically, liberal ideology strikes against the ideological checks against licentiousness that the 
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framers adopted from republicanism. Virtue and interdependence are substituted for ambition 
and self-interest in a liberal system. Without these ideological checks, the institutional checks 
will also suffer. The ability of bodies such as the Senate to unite the nation in pursuit of a 
common good are only as capable as its members. It would be difficult to conceive of individuals 
rising to power which are only concerned in the common good from a society which encourages 
liberal pursuit of self-interest above all. Therefore, all that the institutional checks of the framers 
are good for is to block individual ambition in government stagnation rather than heading a 
unified effort towards a common good. That is how the Senate seems to operate today, as a place 
where measures die, not a body devoted to the common good. This is due to the loss of an 
ideological framework resistant to fragmentation in self-interest, rather, liberalism only seems to 
move us closer to a state of licentiousness in its inability to unite individuals precisely because of 
its emphasis on individual self-interest.  
To be fair to liberalism, much of its emphasis on negative liberty and the protection of the 
individual stems from its intense for focus on resistance to tyranny. This is an area where some 
overlap can be observed between liberalism and republicanism as both are concerned with 
guarding against the influence of tyranny. As stated previously, tyranny can be understood as the 
arbitrary imposition of the will of another. The crucial difference in both ideologies’ conception 
of tyranny is where they see it stemming from. Republicanism is primarily concerned with 
tyranny from abroad. Classical republicanism focuses on the political liberty of the community, 
and so long the community is free from tyranny as a political unit, then they would conceive of 
themselves as free. Liberalism, again as an extension of its emphasis on negative liberty, also 
fears tyranny from within the government over individuals. Therefore, under liberalism, the 
government can be tyrannical in a way that is not conceived of under republicanism. Recall that 
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citizens of ancient republics did not see any interference in their lives as unjust, so long as it 
affected every citizen equally. This is not the case in liberalism, as liberalism sets a limit on the 
extent to which government can control individuals. This limit is the unalienable rights which are 
meant to predate government and therefore be beyond reproach.  
 These different conceptions of tyranny create disagreement between republicanism and 
liberalism in the amount of authority which should be vested in government. Early shades of 
liberal resistance to an overly-authoritative government can be observed in the original debates 
over the American Constitution. There were those who were against the Constitution on the 
grounds that the framers had created a system which ceded all authority to the federal 
government, thereby robbing the liberty of individual states’ power. Today, in a society which 
has almost entirely adopted this liberal point of view, too much emphasis is placed on negative 
liberty in the attempt to guard against tyranny from within. This is another area in which 
liberalism has had an outsized voice. Again, by taking aspects of each ideology, a balance can be 
found which incorporates liberal developments while also including the republican principles 
that our system was founded on. Namely, the republican emphasis on political liberty of the 
community and procurance of the common good need to reenter our political lexicon in order to 
check liberalism’s tendency to fragment communities into a state of licentiousness. I think this 
political isolation can be seen today as the polarization of our system seems a direct result of 
liberalism’s rejection of a common good approach to government for one which serves to affirm 
the individual only. If we were to adopt more republican ideology, we could refocus government 
on the pursuit of a common good, and by keeping liberal emphasis on allowing intervention only 
to the boundary of inalienable rights, we can strike a balance between licentiousness and tyranny 
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that the framers would have wanted in their system and one which can move us past our modern 
fragmentation.  
A Liberal Individual 
 
The new conception of an individual and community relationship was an important 
aspect of the system that the framers designed, however it is also the most easily corrupted by 
liberalism. It is more crucial to understand the ideological basis of this aspect of what the framers 
created than any other piece of their system. The framer’s decision to make room for private 
interests and redefine virtue in individuals was in an effort to create a more durable form of 
republican virtue rather than an adoption of liberal ideology. This is significant because it is 
contemporary theorists which have tried to attach liberal ideology to this relationship, not the 
framers. By defining this relationship through liberal ideals, the divide between individuals and 
their political community has only deepened. What is worse, is individual relationships have 
suffered as well as we have embraced a system of competition rather than cooperation. The 
framers never intended for individuals to forget their interdependence on one another for our 
well-being, yet I think today Americans adhere to a system which rejects this relational basis for 
our individual and community relationship.   
The redefinition of the individual by the framers was at its core a redefinition of virtue. 
What the framers crucially realized is that past republics had been crippled by citizens’ inability 
to separate themselves from their self-interest in such a way that their actions would always align 
with virtue. Ancient republics relied too heavily on the virtue of the everyday citizens so the 
framers established a new relationship between the individual and their commitment to 
communal virtue. For the purposes of analyzing this relationship, it is best to think of virtue as 
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becoming federalized in the American system. In this sense, virtue was only required and divided 
amongst certain levels of the American system. The average person was left free to pursue a 
private life because the system no longer required them to bring virtue to it. Yet, the American 
system was still open to, and indeed encouraged, virtuous citizens who were focused on a 
common good to pursue roles in government. Institutionally they ensured that even if individuals 
operated without virtue, a common good could still be procured through government, or at the 
very least ambition could not break the system. Virtue, for the individual, took on an economic 
context in the American republic. The worth of an individual was no longer measured by their 
contribution publicly, but in their ability to be economically productive members of society. This 
shift had many causes, from the want against continued warfare, to the Protestant 
conceptualization of virtues which took on the context of work ethic, but most importantly it was 
an attempt of the framers to create a more durable form of virtue. This new form of virtue was 
more durable because it allowed room for self-interest. Where previous republics had relied on 
citizens to place aside self-interest, the American framers realized it could not be easily 
eliminated, and therefore rather than risk self-interest undermining their republic, they allowed it 
to flourish.  
The self-interest envisioned by the framers was not one that was unlimited, but one that 
had clear confines. For one, the framers never envisioned a commitment to self-interest that 
would eradicate our sense of interdependence. As previously noted by Hamilton, the merchant 
would recognize in a commercial society that the good of the merchant was reliant on the good 
of the farmer. This tied individuals together that though their aims may have been individual, 
they were all pursuing economic well-being the same way. The economic pursuit envisioned by 
the framers did not pit neighbors against one another but united them in pursuit of a better life. 
51 
 
Tocqueville speaks of this form of pursuit as integral to the early American identity. Individuals 
were not pursuing opulence, but were attempting to carve out a modest or restrained wealth for 
the goal of slightly bettering their position. Most importantly, Tocqueville notes that Americans 
refused to sacrifice their own moral convictions in order to obtain more, but would only seek to 
obtain within their moral boundaries.100 The transitioning of virtue to economic rather than 
political terms was never intended by the founders to create a system hostile to cooperation and 
interdependence.  
The addition of liberal ideology to the economic system envisioned by the framers does 
not make the same considerations to the protection of virtue and interdependence that a 
republican ideology did. Tocqueville described the early warning signs that a different kind of 
economic system than the one envisioned by the framers was beginning to take hold in America. 
Because every individual is pursuing the same goal of material well-being, they naturally come 
into competition with one another. Therefore they continuously chase material gratification in 
order to try to reach a greater degree of well-being, but this constant pursuit of equality is 
unattainable says Tocqueville.101 This drive for a goal that is unfulfillable causes a tension to 
exist in American life which Tocqueville notes. Even amongst modest well-being, Americans are 
always searching for more material gratification to satisfy themselves.102 It is easy to see how 
this system turns inward on itself and divides individuals. Anything that one’s neighbor has is 
something thy do not themselves possess. Therefore, they are in competition with one another to 
collect and hoard as much wealth as possible because they both possess an ever-consuming 
desire for more.  
 
100 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 621 
101 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 627 
102 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 625 
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As liberal ideology has progressed to modernity, we find ourselves in a system 
completely hostile to a restrained and cooperative economic style of pursuit. We live in an 
economic paradigm which is ripe with examples of individuals forfeiting the good of those 
around them for the pursuit of economic gain. Take for example the outsourcing of entire 
companies to other places or nations, often to the great detriment of their original communities. 
Cities like Detroit or Pittsburg stand as reminders of the damage that can be felt from the loss of 
major industries. Yet, the companies that left did so, seemingly, with little regard for their 
original homes. Rather, they would sooner leave and allow the demise of their community in 
favor of better tax rates and cheaper labor. Even on a micro level, everyday interactions are only 
seen in their transactional capacity, and a good deal is one where the individual making it comes 
out ahead in some way. How often is the question “what is in it for me?” asked when individuals 
are petitioned to join a cause or assist their community members? An oft cited passage from 
Adam Smith, considered by many to be the father of capitalism, states that it is not by the 
benevolence of the butcher, brewer, or baker we expect our dinner, but because of their own self-
interest and their desire to obtain what they want themselves.103 What this passage does not say, 
is that the butcher should be taken advantage of, so as to extract the most meat possible for the 
least payment. Though it is transactional for Smith, it is still not hostile to mutual benefit. 
However, that is not how individuals are taught to conceive of economic exchange today. Rather, 
everything is in play so long as it contributes to an individual’s economic success. We are 
encouraged to “pull yourself up by your bootstraps” and do everything on your own. The result 
is a system with no room for compromise, and one which makes our greatest rival anyone else 
who is pursuing a better life for themselves.  
 
103 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, (Modern Library, New York: 1994), 15. 
53 
 
Overall, liberal economic ideology’s greatest threat to the American system is the 
abandonment of any sense of interdependence. By putting us all at odds with one another, all 
communal trust and loyalty is destroyed, and we are left as isolated and fragmented individuals. 
This is not conducive to a republican system built on the ideals of cooperation and shared 
ambition. Our modern conception of the individual undermines what the framers were trying to 
create and leaves us with an incomplete system.  
 
The American Dream 
 
As was stated at the beginning of this paper, the true tension between republicanism and 
liberalism is how each conceive of the relationship between public and private life. Each 
ideology associates one or the other as constituting what we can call the “good life”. For 
republicanism, this is in public life, as serving the community is the greatest thing an individual 
can do. Conversely, liberalism associates private, especially economic, life as holding the key to 
true happiness. Becoming economically potent and powerful is the measure of an individual. In 
order for us to solve the inherent contradiction between the two ideologies pulling at American 
society, there must be a conversation regarding what we can agree constitutes the good life. 
What is important in life, where we derive meaning, and what gives us purpose are the questions 
that must be sorted out for us to ever strike a balance between republican and liberal thought.  
The particular aspect of liberalism which has redefined American life is its application to 
economic theory. Though liberalism was conceived of as a political philosophy, it has 
transformed to take on greater significance economically. While liberal ideology is certainly 
invoked in terms of government deregulation and in limiting government power, it is the 
54 
 
economic sector which has benefitted from this shift. The powers which liberalism strips from 
government to not disappear, but simply shift to other areas of American society. Take for 
example healthcare, if government is relieved of its responsibility to provide healthcare to its 
citizens, healthcare does not disappear. Rather, it has just become privatized in American life. 
Likewise, where we place value in American life has shifted to the private sector over the public 
as a part of liberalism’s effect on republican government power. The ramifications of this aspect 
of liberal ideology is twofold. First, the government has been limited in its ability to perform its 
fundamental function of providing for the well-being of all, to the point that the American 
republic does not hold unified sovereignty. Second, because liberalism values economic success 
as the greatest achievement for an individual, Americans have lost the ability to achieve 
fulfillment in their lives. Rather, our system encourages ceaseless acquisition at the expense of 
all else. Without a renewal of republican ideology our American republic will continue to be 
weakened and any sense of communal interdependence will be completely forgotten.  
At the root of how liberal ideology has reduced the ability of our republic to provide for a 
communal good is the splitting of American sovereignty. This is a problem which has long been 
flagged as dangerous by political theorists. When sovereignty is split between two or more 
entities, there exists the potential for conflict. If two bodies, equally capable of imposing their 
will have conflicting interests, then there is not authority adequate to resolve this disagreement. It 
is this reasoning that the framers opted for a strong federal government in the first place. Without 
it, there existed to power to resolve issues between equally powerful states under the Articles of 
Confederation. However, the framers created an important check on their federal government 
that was meant to ensure it would not become tyrannical. Sovereignty was not vested in the 
federal government, but in the people of the United States. This is crucial because it is only 
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through the consent of us as citizens that our federal government has power. In other words, the 
government is only a vehicle through which we, the people, are able to enact our will as the seat 
of sovereignty. In this way, the federal government is fundamentally beholden to the interests of 
all its citizens equally, and holds a responsibility to provide for our common good.  
However, liberal ideology’s fear of central authority, as it concerns individual rights, has 
caused the American republic to be weakened in the sense that we have decided there are areas 
of life that the government has no legitimate authority over. The sector that American liberalism 
has most shielded from government intervention is the economic sector. Again, just because the 
power is taken away from government does not mean that it disappears, but that it is moved. In 
this way, the American people have ceded some of its sovereignty to the private sector. Yet, 
crucially, unlike the government, the private sector owes nothing to individual citizens for its 
sovereignty. The private sector is driven by indifferent forces aimed solely at the expansion of 
capital, not the good of its individual actors.  
Take for example benefits distributed by companies, such as paid time off or sick leave. 
Workplaces provide these benefits to better attract highly qualified workers, yet if a company 
decides it will no longer provide benefits there is nothing to say it cannot. Sure, it may lose many 
of its workers, but what of those workers who cannot afford to quit and find another job? What 
responsibility does the company have to provide for the well-being of these workers? So long as 
they are fulfilling their contractual agreement to pay individuals for their labor, they are 
providing all our system says is owed of them. What can this be called other than implicit 
recognition that the private sector holds significant power over our ability as individuals to 
obtain well-being? Agrarian republican thinkers, such as Jefferson, saw wage labor as a form of 
“slavery” precisely because the wage worker is beholden to the will of whoever is paying. Yet, 
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the American republic has become dependent on the private sector to provide for individual well-
being, which has in turn divided sovereignty in American life between public and private. No 
better tangible example of this exists than the 2008 financial crisis, which fully highlighted the 
way in which American livelihood is divided. The facts that banks, who had run themselves into 
bankruptcy through predatory and opportunistic lending practices at the expense of the American 
people, were termed “too big to fail” clearly shows the inability of our republic to ensure the 
well-being of its citizens. Rather, we have become beholden to private entities which are not 
equally beholden to us, and this has severely limited our republic’s ability to ensure any 
semblance of a common good.  
Tocqueville, in imagining what the American system could become, saw the grave 
danger of pursuing economic self-interest at the expense of ceding sovereignty. He says that as 
individuals become chiefly occupied with their self-interest, they forget the relationship that exits 
between their own particular well-being and the prosperity of all. These citizens then become 
unconcerned with governance as it is viewed as an inconvenience or a distraction from their true 
task of creating their fortunes. He says “there is no need to strip such citizens of their rights: they 
let those rights slip away voluntarily”. In attending only to what they see as their own affairs, 
they neglect what Tocqueville describes as their chief affair: being their own masters.104 It is this 
process which can has seemingly taken hold in modern America. It may seem like a perfectly 
sound decision to limit government’s ability to regulate the economic sector because of it hinders 
an individual. But in only taking a self-interested view, an individual loses sight of how 
weakening the government only strengthens private actors to act with impunity.  
 
104 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 630 
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An example of this phenomenon is prescription drug prices in the United States. They are 
absurdly high compared to the rest of the world. Private medical firms are able to raise their 
prices because it is good for them and because the republic has been told it does not have power 
over them. Individuals who work for drug companies, seeing the opportunity to increase their 
own fortunes by deregulating the drug industry, obviously would want this. However, the ability 
for drug companies to endlessly raise their prices allows them to gain power over individuals. In 
a paradox of self-interest, by tying the hands of government out of individual economic pursuit, 
we have become beholden to these private entities. Now, a common situation for individuals is 
that they may not be able to afford drug prices that they need to keep themselves alive, so they 
turn to the government for help. Yet the government has been rendered powerless because liberal 
ideology states that the government has no ground to interfere, or that somehow regulation 
would be an overreach. Now, an individual is left looking towards these companies to lower their 
prices out of benevolence and regard for a common good, but of course private entities are not 
tasked with providing for individual “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”. So, the 
individual sits in a hopeless situation where they have now become beholden to private actors 
because they literally hold the power over their life. We have now clearly reached the extent of 
Tocqueville’s fears as our misguided attempts to pursue self-interest have left us servile to the 
whims of an unchecked private sector, stuck under the sort of tyranny liberal ideology has long 
been hostile to.  
The important concept when discussing authority over the economic sector is regulation. 
Republicanism is not socialism. Republics of the past did not own the means of production, but 
were integral in ensuring they operated in a healthy way which promoted the goals of the 
community. For example, Rome had laws restricting conspicuous displays of wealth as an 
58 
 
attempt to curb extreme wealth inequality. Likewise, their economic paradigm encouraged 
reinvestment from the wealthiest individuals for the betterment of the community. Liberal 
economic theory, especially in the United States, has become increasingly hostile to any 
economic regulation. It seems there exists only two options in American economic thought: 
laissez faire or socialism. Republicanism, if it is allowed to re-enter American thought, offers a 
third solution. It allows for government to possess the ability to ensure our economic system can 
operate for the good of all rather than for just a few at the top. Republican regulation can be 
compatible with a capitalist system as well. People can still be allowed to pursue private ends, 
just not at the expense of the collective good. Capitalism meshes with a republican system when 
it is imagined the same way it was imagined by the framers; not as a zero-sum system of 
competition, but one where individuals recognize that by raising the well-being of all, they see 
their own well-being rise as well. However, the ability of the American republic to curb 
economic self-interest has been all but eliminated, which leaves us in an economic system 
without interdependence, and one which has rendered us at the mercy of its desires without the 
power to control it.  
Liberal economic theory has clearly produced problems at a system wide level, however 
it has also changed us at a fundamentally personal level. Economic pursuit has become how we, 
American society, has defined the idea of living well. By living well, I mean what we value as a 
society or what we view as the picture of a perfect life. In other words, Americans tend to 
measure whether or not a person has a good life based on their economic status. A billionaire is 
the peak aspiration of what can be achieved in America, likewise middle class members are 
doing well but could have more in life, and those in poverty are judged by some as not having 
lived up to the potential of the American dream.  
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On the outside, this system of endless pursuit of economic gain seems simple, but upon 
deeper examination it has real complexity. If any individual were to be asked why they want 
more money, there are usually motivations besides simply having more wealth. Answers may be 
along the lines of providing a better life for them and their family, getting their kids in school, or 
simply being able to stop working and retire eventually. At the heart of these answers is what we 
as a society may truly see as important in life: each other. If we were to truly examine the heart 
of economic pursuit it would be that money is a means to the end of being able to enjoy time 
with those we love. Be it our families, friends, or other loved ones, time with them and 
enjoyment is what people are ultimately striving towards. The problem is that liberalism does not 
make room for this part of the equation. If the goal of liberalism is individual liberty and 
security, and the means to this is individual acquisition of wealth, what is to say how much is 
enough? We have never defined what living well means in our liberal system besides that it 
means being economically better off than you were yesterday. This leaves no room for anything 
besides striving towards economic gain, because if it is the only vehicle to obtaining our 
American understanding of living well, then what other option is there to pursue it 
wholeheartedly? 
The true tragedy of this unattainable goal of American society is that it causes individuals 
to pursue wealth at the expense of the very things we are supposedly striving to ensure. 
Tocqueville observed this phenomenon in its beginnings. He says of the pursuit of “material 
gratification” amongst Americans that they grasp at everything that comes before them as if they 
“suffer from the perpetual fear of passing away before finding the time to enjoy them”.105 





surprise that they lived in a constant state of fear of not having enough resources to allow them to 
live well. This phenomenon seems just as true today as it did for Tocqueville. We choose the 
pursuit of economic gain over the enjoyment of loved ones constantly. How often is the narrative 
that if you devote yourself wholly to your job in your twenties that you may reap the benefits at 
an older age? Parents are often forced to miss significant moments in their children’s’ lives 
because jobs only allow for so much vacation time a year. Because our only method of living 
well is economic, we are afforded no choice in the matter. It is either devote yourself to your 
work or lose any ability live well, and this tears us from the aspects of life which we truly value. 
We may devote ourselves to economic pursuit because it is a means to live well, but the 
economic sector demands a level of devotion that leaves us unable to enjoy the aspects of life 
which add value.   
Relentless economic pursuit is only half of the picture of how liberal economic ideology 
breaks down the individual under the guise of self-interest. It’s emphasis on the necessity of 
individualism in economic gain isolates us from one another, and most importantly leaves us 
without a safety net. Economic gain is an individual practice in American society. The mantra of 
“pulling oneself up by their bootstraps” is pervasive in American culture, but is also a signal of 
the dividing aspect of American economic thought. Therefore, when an individual is not able to 
“pull themselves up”, there exists no capacity for the community to help them achieve living 
well. Because individuals are viewed as adversaries to the ultimate goal of wealth acquisition, 
how would helping a fellow individual be in one’s self interest? The fact is that it is not in the 
American system. This is a direct result of the emphasis on individualism present in liberal 
ideology. It creates a system which assumes that any failure to economically advance is a result 
of a defect in that individual, thereby creating no incentive to improve the well-being of all. This 
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is a fundamental mistake in liberal ideology as it completely destroys the interdependence that is 
so crucial to keeping us united as a republic. Republican ideology is unafraid to help all members 
of the community because its focus is not on individual well-being as an end, but in collective 
well-being which in turn provides individual security in the fact that no one is alone in their 
pursuit of a better life. Until American society can recapture this aspect of republican thought, 
we will all be left chasing individual well-being, amongst individuals who we view as enemies, 
and devoid of any assurances that we will ever be able to live well.  
Recontextualizing what we, as members of the American republic, are striving for is 
crucial to feeling security in the fact that we might all achieve a level of living well. Republican 
emphasis on the idea that we are united in creating a collective well-being brings a sort of 
reassurance that liberalism lacks. With this assurance, it leaves room for the aspects of life 
identified previously that I believe can be agreed upon as the best things in life. The focus of 
republics of the past was never economic, but in public things. Participating politically alongside 
your fellow community member for the good of your family and friends is the greatest thing an 
individual could do. It is this animating spirit that must be recaptured. Money and economic 
pursuit is something that never satisfies and always leaves individuals wanting more. 
Conversely, the fulfillment that can be gained through community is one that is infinite and 
uniquely beautiful. Without it, the profound frustration and fear felt by so many today is no 
surprise, as individuals are stuck in a system that can never be won and which ultimately leaves 
individuals isolated. Until we can have a restructuring of our priorities as a society, I fear that we 
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